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Parliamentary committees could hold the answer to Britain’s
democratic decline
British democracy is stuck in a deflated, short-term trap thanks to a number of slow burning structural changes
such as the rise of the 24 hour media. Here, Professor Ian Marsh, the author of ‘Democratic Decline and
Democratic Renewal: Political Change in Britain, Australia and New Zealand’ argues that newly empowered
Parliamentary committees hold the answer and can ground Parliament in longer-term thinking and offer a
check on the ministerial dominance of Parliament.
In a
recent
post
f or
the
LSE’s
Brit ish
Polit ics and Policy blog, I argued that the origins of  democratic decline lie in three slow-burning structural
changes: hollowed out parties, convergence in major party agendas and the post 60s pluralisation of
cit izen identit ies. As a consequence, the polit ical conversation is now largely trapped in a short term cage.
But these same structural changes also make it highly unlikely that the major parties could ever recover
their f ormer agenda setting and mobilisation roles. So if  the parties are unlikely to renew these capabilit ies,
how, in a Westminster-style parliamentary system, might agenda setting and interest aggregation be
renewed and links between cit izens and the f ormal system deepened?
This requires an analogue of  the older party conf erences and other party agenda setting processes, but
now constructed around single issues. Any new polit ical and policy making architecture would need to
demonstrate a capacity to intervene inf luentially at the strategic or agenda entry end of  the public
conversation. It would need to inf luence (reciprocally) the attitudes and orientations of  interest groups,
social movements and other protagonists. It would need to engage the media at an earlier point in the
policy cycle. By these and other means it would also need to f acilitate social learning. These are demanding
requirements. How might they be met?
In the earlier post, I argued only one institution – parliamentary committees – could meet these
requirements. But they could only do this if  reinf orced by procedural and other changes that assigns them a
new and inf luential role in the f ormal policy making process. These changes would need to be polit ical,
cultural and institutional.
At a polit ical level, a weakening of  party discipline is essential. Voting ref orm and multi-party polit ics may be
preconditions f or such a development. Meantime, a more democratic upper house could create an
alternative (or supplementary) site f or committee inf rastructure. At a cultural level, the notion that major
emerging issues should f irst be exposed in a transparent setting and bef ore decisions are taken by the
executive would conf ound many present assumptions and conventions. At an institutional level, the
allowances of  chairs, committee work as a career track, committee standing, procedures surrounding the
debate of  reports and the resources available to committees would all need to be reworked. These are
demanding requirements and of  course the many obstacles cannot be understated.
But what is the alternative? A rampant populism abetted by f ocus group polit ics, the marketing model and a
24-hour media cycle is surely prof oundly corrupting – and its presence can only be curtailed if  an equally
potent countervailing inf rastructure – one that can f acilitate social learning – is appropriately embedded in
the f ormal structure of  power.
Parliamentary committees could of f er new essentially polit ical capacities to recreate the outcomes that
were f ormerly located in the mass party organisations. In this role, they would complement other
instruments of  enquiry and assessment. Indeed, they may induce the creation of  additional inf rastructure
(e.g. an analogue of  the Congressional Budget Of f ice attached to the legislature; or deliberative f orums –
like Citizens Juries, deliberative assemblies, blue-ribbon panels – of  various kinds). Committees would add
essential polit ical depth and reach to such ancillary mechanisms. They have the capacity to do this around
single issues. Their f indings might then inf orm subsequent debate between the rival polit ical elites.
A preliminary case f or nominating parliamentary committees (and the overall committee system) as crit ical
potential agents of  democratic renewal might involve grounds such as the f ollowing. First, they can
constitute a point of  access f or interest groups and social movements. Such organisations are now
ubiquitous. They are key representatives of  and advocates f or a more dif f erentiated cit izenry. They are at
least as democratically grounded as any of  the major parties. Hence, their engagement is essential to
broaden representation.
Second, committees should have access to the voting power of  the legislature. Drawing on this access,
committees can constitute a medium f or improving the alignment between parliamentary rituals and policy
making realit ies. Access to the voting power of  parliament places committees on an equivalent f ormal
f ooting to that of  ministers. If  committee members f eel suf f iciently strongly about an issue, and if  they are
able to persuade a suf f icient number of  their colleagues to support them, they can gain attention f or their
views on the f loor of  the House. They can if  necessary challenge the executive, a course of  action which
the incentive structure of  a multi-party environment and/or weakened party discipline is likely to encourage.
Parliament of f ers a transparent setting f or such activity. These processes create the scenes, acts and
cameo dramas of  parliamentary lif e. The possibility of  such action would likely stimulate media interest in
committee deliberations and hence extend their reach into public opinion more broadly.
Recasting the parliamentary theatre in such terms might have a third benef it. In of f ering a new f ocus f or
media attention and new content f or media reports, a better alignment between policy making processes
and the development of  interest group and public opinion might be established. The dynamics of  social
learning determine this outcome. In appearing bef ore enquiries, gathering evidence f rom their members,
reporting the results of  their participation, engaging with the views of  other protagonists (including
departments), and f orming more encompassing advocacy coalit ions, processes of  social learning can be
stimulated. Parliamentary deliberations that are more closely aligned to the substance of  issues might
reinf orce this outcome. By such means, parliamentary rituals and debates might be more congruent with
policy choices. This is essential to develop social learning.
Fourth, parliamentary committees can open up access at the right moments in the policy cycle – at the
agenda entry end when issues are still being def ined and their signif icance evaluated. These matters are
now largely the prerogative of  the executive. Ministers or mostly control f ormal agenda entry. Parliamentary
committees of f er the only extra-party inf rastructure capable of  qualif ying executive power.
Parliament is a kind of  theatre. Its successive acts and scenes and cameo dramas create a mise en scene
that, in adversarial settings, simulates the real struggle f or power of  an election campaign. The question is:
in a more pluralised society, can this drama be recast to impact constructively on public opinion? Would a
committee and parliamentary conversation that f ocuses on strategic issues, partially independent of  the
struggle f or of f ice between government and opposition, achieve this outcome? In ef f ect, this would involve
the creation of  a contemplative phase in the policy process, one that would precede but inf orm f inal
choices, which would remain the prerogative of  the executive. Because of  it inf luence on policy, the
deliberations that occur in this new phase could be expected to attract much more intense media interest.
These are the general arguments in f avour of  a substantial development of  committee roles. They move
well beyond present arrangements. Enthusiasm must be qualif ied by a clear-eyed assessment of  present
committee experience, hobbled as it is by the Whips and by parliamentary procedures that are oriented to
the executive. Perhaps most of  all enthusiasm must be qualif ied by recognition of  the hold of  established
polit ical habits and expectations. These are embedded in all parties and are of ten grounded in deep
scepticism about enhanced transparency and participation. They also ref lect def ence of  immediately
perceived major party interests. No doubt change, if  it  is to occur, must await a virtually irresistible
accumulation of  pressures and perhaps the leadership of  a twenty-f irst century Disraeli or Gladstone.
But democratic renewal is in the f irst instance a challenge to polit ical imagination. Is there an architecture
that can enrich and deepen the public polit ical conversation – one that can enhance the social learning of
all participants and protagonists? In the architecture envisaged here, this conversation would commence at
the level of  a policy community, continue through parliamentary committee enquiries, and gather f urther
momentum through the drama of  f loor debates and their associated routines and procedures. Many
elements of  this conversation occur now, but mostly in a disconnected f orm. They are to be f ound in the
various nooks and crannies of  the public sphere and the f ormal policy system. Bureaucracies dissect
issues and sometimes publish background papers. Think tanks cogitate. Interest groups and social
movements agitate. When an event of  suf f icient moment arises – or is stage managed – the media reports.
But these currents and eddies are now relatively separated. They are not integrated or f used into a
common stream. Parliament is the only authoritative setting where this could occur. Parliamentary
committees are the tried and tested vehicle f or this task.
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